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Policy-making in Franklin roosevelt’s  
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Sam Shearer
Eastern Kentucky University
Appointed head military attaché in Hitler’s Berlin in 1935, career U .S . Army officer Truman Smith harbored no illusions about the challenges 
he faced . As he recalled later in his memoirs: “I saw at firsthand how inade-
quately organized, staffed, and financed the Military Intelligence Division was . 
It became clear to me also that Military Intelligence was the orphan branch 
of the General Staff and the army as a whole and that military attachés lacked 
prestige and were little regarded or listened to” (26) . Despite inadequate 
support and seemingly insurmountable obstacles to access, Smith produced 
over the next three years a series of startling yet remarkably accurate reports 
on the Nazi military buildup that held the potential to influence deeply the 
course of American military and diplomatic policy . Far from achieving their 
intended influence, however, Smith’s reports drew the otherwise obscure 
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military attaché into a political maelstrom not of his own making—a tempest 
that owed much to Smith’s association with famed but increasingly controver-
sial American aviator Charles Lindbergh, whose celebrity Smith exploited to 
gain critical access to Luftwaffe airfields . Amid the heated polemic that swirled 
about him, the stunningly accurate intelligence information contained in 
Smith’s reports languished in obscurity . On detailed examination, the case of 
Truman Smith demonstrates in a profound manner the ways that domestic 
political agendas and controversies clouded U .S . foreign policy-making in the 
years leading up to the Second World War . Although the international order 
today is fundamentally different from that of the 1930s, Smith’s case may also 
hold important lessons for the early twenty-first-century United States con-
cerning the unforeseen costs of polarization and a political culture in which 
opposing parties often dismiss even simple factual information put forward 
by their supposed political enemies .
After an accomplished military career leading up to and during World 
War II, Truman Smith (1893–1970) was seemingly forgotten . His name 
was seldom mentioned after the war until his memoirs were published 
posthumously in 1984 . Since then, intrigued historians and journalists 
have sporadically examined his strange story . History shows Smith to be an 
astoundingly successful figure in military intelligence . Though hampered by 
his lack of rank, Smith first submitted intelligence reports from Germany on 
the nascent Nazi movement while he was assigned to Berlin as an assistant 
military attaché in 1920–24 . From 1935 to 1938, Smith returned to Ger-
many to serve as head military attaché . Part of the reason Smith’s intelligence 
efforts were exceptionally insightful and accurate in this vital period was his 
summer 1936 decision to take advantage of Charles Lindbergh’s fame to gain 
better access to German air facilities . Despite Smith’s efforts and his warnings 
about the German military build-up, his reports were mostly dismissed by the 
Roosevelt administration . For his efforts, Smith was labeled first an alarmist 
and later a Nazi sympathizer .
After serving in combat during World War I, Smith served as a military 
observer and assistant attaché in Berlin from June 1920 to April 1924 . In 
November of 1922, Smith became the first American official to interview 
Adolf Hitler and subsequently submitted reports on Nazi aims and ambi-
tions that were nearly prophetic, even though he lacked rank and his reports 
were mostly ignored . He did, however, manage through his 1920–1924 stint 
in Berlin to forge relationships with German military figures that proved to 
be invaluable contacts when he returned as head military attaché later in his 
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career . His warnings in these early years came, moreover, nearly a decade 
before other more prominent voices began warning the rest of the world 
about Hitler’s intentions .
In the years between 1924 and 1935, Smith held various posts . Most nota-
bly, from 1928 to 1932 he served as an instructor at the Fort Benning Infantry 
School, where General George Marshall was in command . During this time, 
Smith formed a close professional relationship with Marshall, and the general 
subsequently acted as Smith’s patron for the remainder of his career .
Smith’s second posting in Berlin from 1935 to 1938 as head military atta-
ché, which was the most interesting and historically significant of his career, 
can be divided into two sections . From 1935 through the first half of 1936, 
he struggled as his reports were widely dismissed by both the military and 
the Roosevelt administration . In November of 1936, however, Smith took a 
trip to Washington at his own expense to impress upon his military superiors 
the seriousness of events in Berlin . This trip was quite successful, and Smith 
received considerable support from the military going forward . In addition, 
Smith began making use of Lindbergh in his air intelligence in the summer of 
1936 . In combination with his newly acquired military backing and the sup-
port of Lindbergh, Smith’s reports received considerable circulation in the 
highest level of United States government in 1937–1938 . These reports, most 
notably the General Air Estimate of 1937, contained powerful language that 
vividly described the rapid expansion of the German military .
After Smith was diagnosed with diabetes and subsequently exited his post 
in Berlin in December of 1938, he proceeded to work as a military adviser 
in Washington . During this time, 1939–1941, he came under fire from vari-
ous figures in the Roosevelt administration . A diverse range of factors, most 
notably his history with Lindbergh, contributed to the attacks he received . 
Smith entered retirement in 1941, but returned to active duty after the attack 
on Pearl Harbor at the request of General Marshall . During the war, Smith 
served as a military advisor to General Marshall, and he retired with the rank 
of colonel in 1946 .
Though Smith’s reports on Hitler from the early 1920s are certainly his-
torically significant, his reports from the late 1930s are even more so . Not 
only is the content of the reports militarily important, but the reception of 
the reports holds complicated lessons concerning the nature of U .S . politi-
cal culture in the years leading up to World War II . Ultimately, the question 
remains: Why were Smith’s reports mostly ignored within U .S . policymak-
ing circles? The answer to this question is complex, and contributing factors 
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varied according to changing viewpoints and priorities within the Roosevelt 
administration itself from 1935 to 1940 .
1935–1936: opposing voices
In 1935 and 1936, Smith faced several obstacles in impressing the devel-
opments of the German military on American leadership . One explanation 
for Smith’s reports being undervalued involves his position . In the 1930s, the 
Military Intelligence Division of the Army (G-2) was little respected, and the 
position of military attaché was far from prestigious . These factors gain little 
mention in contemporary sources because allegations of Smith’s Nazi sym-
pathy generally take the spotlight, but the lack of respect held for the post of 
military attaché was a pressing issue for Smith in 1935 and 1936 .
The lack of respect for military attachés is well-documented and was 
matched by the inadequacies of the Military Intelligence Division . Smith 
details his thoughts on G-2 and his initial training for his 1935 Berlin post 
in his memoir Berlin Alert . Of his instruction, Smith notes it to have been 
“cursory and quite inadequate,” to the extent that Smith felt he had gained 
nearly nothing from his training (26) . The struggles within G-2 were well 
known . Among military officers, the post of military attaché was consid-
ered a career dead end . The record of its predecessor agencies provided by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) states that, on the surface, Military 
Intelligence presented the post of attaché as highly respected, claiming that 
attachés received top-notch training before being sent to their assignments . 
This image, however, was far from the reality . The reputation of posts in Mili-
tary Intelligence was so poor that the most qualified officers could seldom 
be recruited for them . In addition, the training in G-2 was so inadequate that 
attachés were often thrown into their posts so unprepared that they could not 
even develop sensible reports (CIA) .
Military attachés were also severely underfunded . The job of attachés was 
far from easy: “Operating against odds, only too often in periods of tension, 
they must exercise discretion in all their procedures: they must refrain from 
spying or other conspiratorial activities, and contacts likely to disturb regular 
‘harmonious,’ peace-conductive diplomatic relations between states” (Vagts 
ix) . Within the tight pressures of not upsetting international politics, attachés 
often gained the bulk of their information from social events . Accordingly, 
the CIA website details the struggle the attaché corps faced in obtaining 
funding:
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The United States was in a serious economic depression, and Con-
gress was not about to increase MID’s budget so that a few attachés 
could host cocktail parties in Paris, Berlin, Rome, London, Moscow, 
and Tokyo . Unfortunately, the annual appropriations battle rein-
forced the perception in the Army at large that the attaché corps was 
nothing more than a well-heeled country club .
As Smith proved however, much could be gained from “cocktail parties .”
Smith recalled that his department’s lack of funding limited his move-
ments in Germany considerably, especially in terms of travel around the 
country (164) . In addition, Smith felt that the U .S . needed an espionage 
presence in Berlin that was separate from the attaché corps, and, as Smith 
noted in his memoirs, “not a penny for espionage was available” (164) . Over-
all, G-2 and the post of military attaché were neither respected nor funded 
sufficiently .
A problem Smith faced specifically concerning his post was his responsi-
bility to report not only on the development of German ground forces but also 
on their rapidly expanding air force . Referring to himself in the third-person, 
Smith detailed the difficulty he faced in reporting on German air develop-
ment: “The military attaché possessed as much, but no more, knowledge of 
air corps organization and tactics than did the average American infantry 
officer who had been trained in the army school system . This was small . His 
technical knowledge of air matters was negligible” (75–76) . His wife, Katha-
rine (Kay) Smith, wrote in her unpublished autobiography that her husband’s 
lack of aeronautical expertise weighed on him heavily because, even with his 
limited knowledge of air science, he knew something huge was occurring in 
Germany (90) .
Smith believed that the lack of respect for his knowledge and the bad rep-
utation of his title were responsible for his reports not being taken seriously 
in the General Staff or the Army Air Corps (84) . The growing strength of the 
German Luftwaffe impressed Smith to the extent that he returned to the States 
at his own expense in November 1936 in an attempt to convince his superiors 
of the seriousness of events in Germany . Smith’s wife records that this trip was 
successful and that he did succeed in swaying much of the military leadership 
he encountered of the growing threat in Germany (Katharine Smith xviii) .
By the end of 1936, Smith had gained considerable support in the mili-
tary . This support would ultimately save his career when the political firestorm 
approached in 1940 . Since the lack of respect for attachés and G-2 was 
substantial, the backing Smith received within the military provided much-
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needed support . Smith’s supporters at this time included not only his former 
boss, General George Marshall, but also a close advisor to Roosevelt, Ber-
nard Baruch . These two men in particular were responsible for Smith’s reports 
being not only circulated in “the highest military circles” in the late 1930s but 
becoming known to influential figures in the Roosevelt administration and 
even the president himself (Truman Smith xvii) .
General Marshall, who became the Chief of Staff of the Army, operated as 
Smith’s patron from when Smith first served under Marshall as an instructor 
at Fort Benning in 1928 to when Smith retired in 1946 . Marshall sent Smith’s 
General Air Estimate from November 1937 to the President as “an example 
of outstanding military intelligence” (Lindbergh 872) . Marshall went on to 
battle the President over military appropriations, and in this combat he relied 
heavily on Smith’s reports .
Bernard Baruch was a chief economic advisor to the President and was 
widely known for having Roosevelt’s ear . One of the only real middlemen in 
the politics surrounding Smith’s story, Baruch was well-liked by the Roosevelt 
administration as well as the administration’s isolationist opponents (Baruch 
307) . Baruch described himself as somewhat “obsessed with the subject of 
preparedness” (276) . The reports Smith was submitting were not only being 
circulated widely enough that they reached Baruch, an economic consultant 
to the President, but Baruch actively used Smith’s reports in some of what he 
calls the “many occasions I was pressing him [FDR] to take more decisive 
preparedness measures” from 1936 through 1940 (276–79) .
Despite the invaluable support from Marshall and Baruch, one of the 
chief criticisms of Smith prior to 1937 was that “some of his reports had exag-
gerated the strength of German forces, especially the air force, in comparison 
with the reports of the British and French” (Truman Smith x) . The perceived 
reliability of foreign attachés was about as tenuous as that of American atta-
chés . Vincent Orange writes in the Journal of Military History that “British 
intelligence departments in the 1930s were short of staff, funds, equipment, 
and prestige . There were far too many of them, they refused to cooperate with 
one another, and they had little influence on decision makers, civilian or mili-
tary” (1015) . This low status was similar to that of the American attaché corps 
although the British attachés in Berlin handled their lack of prestige differ-
ently than Smith did .
Colonel Andrew Thorne assumed his post as head British military 
attaché in Berlin in 1932 . In 1934 and 1935, Thorne reached much differ-
ent conclusions concerning the state of German affairs than Smith would 
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eventually report in 1935 and 1936 . Thorne reported that he felt the German 
army operated separately from Hitler’s rule . He went on to conclude that mili-
tary leaders in Germany were not particularly loyal to Hitler and could put 
a stop to Hitler’s regime at any moment (Wark 592) . Smith could not have 
disagreed more . In his memoirs, Smith incredulously recalled a conversation 
he had with the Supreme Commander of the German Luftwaffe, Hermann 
Goering: “With moist eyes and a voice tinged with emotion, he turned to the 
attaché [Smith] and said, ‘Smith, there are only three truly great characters in 
all history: Buddha, Jesus Christ, and Adolf Hitler’” (100) . Smith was imme-
diately struck by the fanatical devotion and support Hitler elicited . As early 
as 1922, Smith had noted about Hitler: “So intense and dramatic were the 
times, and so well did Hitler understand how to play on the emotions of his 
audiences, that the lack of logic in his message was often entirely overlooked” 
(70) . Though they were proven false not long after they were submitted, 
Thorne’s reports of divided German leadership did damage the influence of 
Smith’s early reports from Berlin in 1935 and 1936 .
In addition, when Colonel F . E . Hotblack took over Thorne’s post in 
Berlin in 1935, he entered with the expectation that Thorne had left for him . 
From 1935 through early 1937, Hotblack’s reports became less and less 
consistent with Thorne’s . By late 1937, when Smith submitted his most mean-
ingful report, “The General Air Estimate of November 1, 1937,” Hotblack’s 
intelligence was in complete support of Smith . At the time Smith submitted 
his General Air Estimate in 1937, Hotblack was submitting reports to British 
Intelligence claiming that Germany would be prepared for an all-out offensive 
against Europe within two years (Wark 599) .
By 1937, contradictory foreign intelligence was no longer an obstacle 
for Smith to overcome . Prior to 1937, however, contradictory reports influ-
enced the reception of Smith’s reports in a major way . Thorne’s reports fueled 
an already raging problem in the perception of Germany held by the United 
States as well as Great Britain from 1933 to 1937, thus greatly impeding the 
impact of Smith’s reports . The idea that the Nazi state was deeply divided was 
one of the worst assumptions made prior to World War II . In seemingly wish-
ful thinking, much of the world’s leadership became convinced that “a policy 
of negotiated and limited readjustment to the international status quo would 
be welcomed within the Third Reich” (Wark 593) . This act of self-deception 
proved to be extremely harmful .
Smith faced another problem in Berlin at the hands of the United States 
ambassador, Dr . William Dodd, who was well known to be a pacifist who had 
truman smith’s rEports on nazi militarism
79
a “marked distaste for military matters” (Smith 76) . He did not like to associ-
ate himself with the military attaché office, but he did enjoy the company of 
professors in Germany . He had no confidence in Army and Navy attachés in 
Berlin, which he said “here, and I think all over Europe, are utterly unequal 
to their supposed functions” (Vagts 71) . While Dodd was instrumental in 
making President Roosevelt aware of the offenses against Jews in pre-war 
Germany, he consistently battled the idea that Germany was militarizing in 
the early 1930s . Even when the military attaché preceding Smith, Colonel 
Jacob Wuest, raised the alarm and tried to alert the United States that Ger-
many was mobilizing for war, Dodd insisted that Wuest was overly excited 
(Vagts 71) . While Dodd asserted that both Wuest and Smith were alarmist, 
he was proven wrong when the Germans took over the Rhineland in 1936 . 
This risky act from Hitler, which Smith reported would happen a few days 
beforehand, completely shocked Dodd (Katharine Smith 83–85) . The well-
educated ambassador had long been a critic of Hitler, but he completely 
underestimated the fiery dictator .
Dodd’s underestimation of Hitler represents a much wider feeling within 
the United States government in the 1930s . The impact of Smith’s reports was 
compromised not only by Dodd but also by the general lack of concern in the 
United States about German military build-up . When Smith began his post 
in 1935 in Berlin, global politics were in a complicated stage during which all 
military intelligence needed to be carefully weighed and considered . Instead, 
as Smith recalls, at no point during his time in Berlin did Dodd ever ask any 
information from Smith on German developments (Truman Smith 77) . 
Dodd’s attitude explains much of why Smith’s reports from 1935 and 1936 
were ignored .
Although Smith consistently reported on German mobilization during 
his entire service in Berlin, his reports in 1937 and 1938 offer the most insight 
into the vicissitudes of United States policymaking at the time . Several barri-
ers stood in the way of Smith’s reports in 1935 and 1936, but by 1937 these 
obstacles had been conquered . In 1937, Dodd had lost credibility, Smith had 
gained immense support from his military superiors, foreign intelligence was 
lining up with his own reports, and Smith gained a new assistant air attaché, 
Major Albert Vanaman, who possessed top-of-the-line aeronautical expertise 
(Smith 106) . Because of these factors, along with the support he received 
from Baruch and Marshall, Smith’s most important report of his service in 
Berlin—his “General Air Estimate of November 1, 1937”—effectively had a 
direct path to the highest levels of the Roosevelt administration . Yet at the 
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same time, other factors remained in play to continue to prevent Smith’s 
reports from exerting much influence on U .S . policy—specifically a wide 
array of domestic political priorities in the 1930s .
1937–1938: domestic priorities
Hitler’s rise to power in Germany stands as one of the most gravely under-
estimated events in history . Across the globe, Hitler was regarded by many 
world leaders as little more than a dupe . Even in Germany, Franz Von Papen, 
who convinced President Paul von Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancel-
lor, was so confident that Hitler was weak and could easily be controlled that 
he boldly claimed, “Within two months we will have pushed Hitler so far into 
the corner that he’ll squeak!” (Craig 570) . While Hitler was being underesti-
mated in Germany, a comical image was simultaneously being created of him 
in the United States .
One of the sources of Hitler’s image in the U .S . as “outrageous” was Doro-
thy Thompson’s book I Saw Hitler, which stemmed from her 1931 interview 
with the soon-to-be leader of Germany and in which she clearly and colorfully 
described Hitler as feminine, socially backward, and mentally fragile (14, 16) . 
Thompson also openly questioned Hitler’s ability to lead; she states in her 
writing that, entering her interview, “I was convinced that I was meeting the 
future dictator of Germany . In something less than fifty seconds I was quite 
sure that I was not” (13) . Time magazine also reported on Hitler as a silly 
figure, making light of his appearance as a “pudgy, stoop-shouldered man” 
and highlighting anything strange about him (“Hitler into Chancellor” 22) . 
Time also went on to fuel an unfortunate and common misconception that 
the Nazi party was “pledged to so many things that it is pledged to nothing” 
(22) . This perception of Hitler was common in the United States in the mid-
1930s, ultimately reducing the impact of Smith’s reports and detracting from 
the plight of Jews in America and in Germany .
This common doubt about the seriousness of Hitler’s regime was a major 
detriment to Smith and his reports . With the exception of Jews, the majority 
of Americans were unconcerned with Hitler . In addition, the concerns and 
protests voiced by Jews in America ultimately did as much harm to their own 
cause as it helped . Rabbis openly criticized Hitler and predicted that he would 
lead the world to another world war (“Rabbis” 28) . On May 11, 1933, fifty 
thousand Jews gathered in Chicago to protest the oppression against Jews in 
Germany (“50,000” 10) . Though this protest did not have a huge effect on the 
public, it did touch Edith Rodgers, a Massachusetts Republican in the U .S . 
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House of Representatives . On May 13, two days after the protest, Rodgers 
voiced in the House her feeling that the United States should intervene in 
Germany to aid the suffering Jews there (“Scores” 7) . Directly after Rodgers 
addressed the House, however, the President released a statement emphasiz-
ing that any actions by the Nazis were strictly European affairs (“U .S .” 4) .
The public was generally in favor of this isolationist policy . Anti-Jewish 
sentiments were extremely common in the United States in the pre-World 
War II era, combining with a Nazi propaganda barrage to eliminate much of 
the sympathy Americans had for German Jews (Elson and Levy 83) . Truman 
Smith recalls in his memoirs that Hitler was outspoken in his speeches against 
the Jews, but the common belief was that his violent rhetoric was exclu-
sively for propaganda purposes and that he would never become too abusive 
to Jews (55) .
Jewish businessmen also had their own scheme turned against them by 
the Nazis when they attempted to boycott German goods on a global scale 
(“Boycott”) . Before Jews began implementing this boycott, the Nazis had 
already begun issuing “warnings” to Jews in general, stating that if they kept up 
their “treachery,” there would be major ramifications (“Hitler Warns Jews”) . 
After the boycott was implemented, the Nazis launched their counter-attack, 
claiming that, by boycotting German goods, the Jews were extending their 
treachery . The Nazis reciprocated by boycotting Jewish goods and services 
and began removing more Jews from positions of importance (“More” 4) .
While the nation was being influenced by German propaganda, Presi-
dent Roosevelt was aware of the true story in Germany . Dodd reported to the 
President on the abuses that German Jews were experiencing, but Roosevelt’s 
lack of concerted response further solidified the impression that, as far as the 
United States government was concerned, Germany’s Jews were essentially 
on their own (Duffy 68–69) . While much of the public simply was not sure 
what to think about Nazi Germany, the President was aware of the situation 
but placed his New Deal programs far above international matters as the main 
priority of the U .S . government at least through late 1937 .
To those whom history remembers as the “New Dealers,” the New Deal 
represented much more than the social reform it literally entailed; it repre-
sented hope that democracy was still a viable system of government . In the 
midst of dictatorships and communism on the rise, Roosevelt wanted to 
turn his New Deal into a “shining light” for democracy (Schwarz xvi–xvii) . 
Roosevelt wanted his program to rise above the attacks from his opponents, 
who called the New Deal the “Jew Deal” and questioned Roosevelt’s motives 
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(Schwarz 129) . In hopes of preventing his New Deal’s funding from being 
spent elsewhere in response to escalated arms concerns, the President put 
much of his faith in global disarmament as a foreign policy strategy .
Those who advocated for military preparedness, many of whom were iso-
lationists, did not agree with Roosevelt on global disarmament (Doenecke) . 
Bernard Baruch is recorded as saying: “Peace does not follow disarmament; 
disarmament follows peace” (266) . Roosevelt’s plan did what he wanted it to 
do, however, because it allowed him to justify postponing military funding 
and slashing military appropriations to create funds for the New Deal .
The President’s handling of Smith’s reports evoked some criticism in the 
late 1930s . Smith described the press coverage of his activities with Lindbergh 
in Berlin as highly inaccurate . He believed that the press simplified German 
affairs and contributed to the misconception that Germany was weak and 
divided . Despite what Smith saw as faulty reporting, the fact remains that he 
and Lindbergh did receive substantial exposure in the press because of Lind-
bergh’s presence in Berlin, but this media coverage did not keep the Roosevelt 
administration from consistently downplaying Smith’s reports . The Roosevelt 
administration’s dismissal of Smith’s intelligence did not sit well with General 
Marshall, however, who went so far as to submit Smith’s reports to the Presi-
dent’s political opponents to keep them from being buried (Truman Smith, 
117–18) .
Almost entirely because of Marshall’s activities, accusations developed 
that the President had purposefully withheld Smith’s reports from Congress 
in order to remove them as a barrier to slashing the military appropriations 
(Vagts 71) . These accusations climaxed when Representative Albert Engel, a 
Michigan Republican, provided well-documented evidence that showed how 
the President cut the annual military appropriations by forty million dollars, 
despite having been aware of Smith’s reports (“Charges”) . Though Smith 
recalls Engel’s attack on the President as being of a completely partisan nature, 
the fact remains that Roosevelt was adamant that the New Deal needed to 
take priority, even when it meant setting aside Smith’s unprecedented but 
unpalatable reports (Truman Smith 117) .
Events surrounding Smith’s reports offer insight into the Roosevelt 
administration and the battle for military appropriations that raged through 
the mid-1930s . The President opposed heavy military spending up until 1938 
when the Sudeten crisis and Kristallnacht began to impact the views of Amer-
ican citizens as well as the administration itself . As Nazi aggression became 
to be more apparent, and as Nazis attacked Jewish businesses and abused 
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their owners, American public opinion began to see beyond the propaganda 
war Germany had launched against the Jews . Public opinion obviously then 
shifted even further against the Nazis when in 1939 the Germans overran 
Poland, Denmark, and Norway (Leuchtenburg 299) . Only in the summer of 
1940, though—when Germany invaded France—did General Marshall suc-
cessfully acquire sufficient funding for the military to begin preparing for the 
clear probability of impending conflict (Cray 152–53) .
Indeed, the military suffered mightily at the hands of domestic politics . 
General Marshall thought the narrow-mindedness of politicians was handi-
capping the military and felt it was important for the United States to be ready 
for war (Cray 126–27, 151) . Similarly to Marshall’s feelings concerning the 
military, Bernard Baruch wrote that he was quite concerned with the inad-
equacy of the American military (177–79) . Baruch also mentioned, however, 
that the President was also quite aware and concerned about how unprepared 
the United States would be if attacked (177–79) . This presents an interesting 
quandary: The President slashed military budgets to create more funds for 
his New Deal, but he also harbored concerns of preparedness, and wanted 
to “shake Americans from their isolationist delusions before it was too late” 
(179) . If Roosevelt was concerned with military preparedness, and wanted to 
act against isolationism, why would he and his administration have covered 
up Truman Smith’s reports? If anything, one would think Roosevelt could 
have used Smith’s reports as evidence to support military buildup .
The largest reason for Roosevelt’s action concerning Smith’s reports came 
down to the same factor that many of the President’s decisions hinged on: 
timing . Exactly at what point the Roosevelt administration’s agenda changed 
from an isolationist one to an interventionist one is a topic for additional 
research, but one point is clear, and that is the President was extremely mindful 
of timing in relation to where public opinion rested at a particular moment . In 
the mid-1930s, regardless of how concerned Roosevelt was with the military, 
the New Deal received “top legislative priority” over foreign policy decisions 
and “the outside world would have to fend for itself ” (McJimsey 191–92) . 
This attitude is consistent with how the President responded to the fifty-thou-
sand Jews that protested against the Nazis in Chicago in 1933 . The President 
had certainly shifted gears, however, by the late 1930s, when he began his 
attempt to sway public opinion in favor of war (McJimsey 194) .
If Smith’s timing in Berlin had been slightly different, his story would be 
remembered in a much different way and may have changed the course of 
world history in a different way . Instead, Smith’s reports were consistently at 
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odds with the President’s agenda . In 1935 and 1936, Smith’s reports contra-
dicted the cuts Roosevelt wanted to implement to military funding, and in 
1937 through 1938, Smith’s reports did not line up with the complex plan 
Roosevelt put in place to systematically shift public opinion in a gradual rather 
than sudden manner . Smith’s reports came across as abrupt and startling, and 
the President was against shocking the public .
A major problem Smith saw in military intelligence was the robotic 
nature of aeronautical reports . In his memoirs Smith described air reports as 
“so bulky, statistical, and technical that anyone who read them needed both 
leisure and training in all branches of aeronautical knowledge to absorb their 
information” (111) . In his “General Air Estimate of November 1, 1937,” Smith 
aimed to create a “brief, all inclusive, and couched in dramatic rather than 
technical terms” summary of Germany air progress (111) . Smith certainly 
succeeded in this effort, providing the War Department with a relatively brief 
but detailed overview of the German Luftwaffe and its immense development . 
Lindbergh was a vital part in the preparation of this report, and his influence 
is clear when reading it . The language is dramatic, to the point and would 
be understandable to nearly any reader . Dramatic reports on German might, 
however, were the last things Roosevelt wanted to reach the public .
Indeed, alarming reports of the huge air power in Germany could incite 
panic in the United States . The political weight of air superiority at the time 
cannot be underestimated as well . Just before World War II, the world was 
transitioning into a time when, as Lindbergh stated: “We can no longer pro-
tect our families with an army . Our libraries, our museums, every institution 
we value most, are laid bare to bombardment” (92–94) . Considering the 
vast concern and fear surrounding air power, the President did not want any 
shocking news to develop and panic the public .
A prime goal of the President was to keep the public calm . He “deliberately 
sought, with the collaboration of the mass media, to avoid controversy and to 
stifle national debate” (Steele 69) . Roosevelt ultimately wanted to stifle any 
shocking news, and he pushed propaganda that tried to illustrate that the gov-
ernment leaders in America were more than capable of handling any complex 
foreign policy decisions that came their way . Rather than pushing the public 
into anxiety over the unsettling events of the world, Roosevelt succeeded in 
producing a “dull, steady, pervasive drum of preparedness information ema-
nating from every popular source of public education” (Steele 71) . Roosevelt 
manipulated the press in order to essentially “sell” his administration .
truman smith’s rEports on nazi militarism
85
Roosevelt’s interference in the media went as far as to force the removal 
of press figures that were critical of his administration’s foreign policy stances . 
One of the most notable instances of the President’s influence on the media 
was when the White House caused the removal of one of CBS’s most pop-
ular news commentators, Boake Carter, for being critical of the Roosevelt 
administration . In contrast, figures that were far more derogatory towards 
the President’s rivals than Carter was against the administration, like the 
extremely popular radio commentator Walter Winchell, were praised (Steele 
83) . Ultimately, the President saw foreign policy issues leading up to World 
War II to be too serious to be up for debate . Roosevelt thought he knew what 
was best for the United States and aimed to influence the public into offering 
the least amount of resistance to his agenda as possible (Steele 92) . Consider-
ing the President’s attitude, the motive for obscuring Smith’s reports is clear . 
In his effort to impress German buildup on American leadership, Smith actu-
ally doomed his own reports, because they were too alarming and unpalatable 
to be utilized in the Roosevelt administration’s agenda, even as the adminis-
tration gradually turned the ship of state towards a war that it increasingly saw 
as inevitable .
Smith ultimately found himself at constant odds with the Roosevelt 
administration . As if his reports being contrary to the agenda of the admin-
istration were not enough, Smith’s association with Lindbergh ultimately 
caused him to be dragged into a fierce political battle . The rivalry between 
Lindbergh and Roosevelt had a deeply polarizing impact across the coun-
try . The rhetoric on both sides was often radically misrepresentative of the 
other side, and Smith was regularly targeted because of his relationship with 
Lindbergh .
1939–1940: political strife
Starting heavily in the summer of 1940, Smith received repeated attacks 
from several members of the Roosevelt administration as a Nazi sympathizer . 
The attacks were fueled less by suspicions of Nazi sympathy than by a politi-
cal grudge resulting from Smith’s relationship with Lindbergh . Smith was 
dragged into a confrontation that had started as early as 1934 when, after an 
investigation into corruption in commercial air lines, Roosevelt ordered an 
immediate halt to all commercial airmail . He handed the task of transport-
ing airmail entirely to the Army . This order turned out to be a tremendous 
mistake, and Lindbergh quickly became a vocal opponent . Lindbergh, who at 
the time possessed fame and influence not matched by even the most famous 
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celebrities today, immediately spoke out against the President’s painting of 
all commercial airlines with the same brush . He warned against the policy 
and predicted that Roosevelt’s hasty action would compromise the safety of 
untrained Army airmen who were being volunteered for the airmail service 
(Davis 357–60) .
Between February 1934, when Roosevelt instituted his ban on commer-
cial airmail, and April 1934, twelve airmen were killed due to their lack of 
training . By the summer, Roosevelt’s ban on commercial airmail was effectively 
lifted, and the entire situation “constituted a personal defeat for Roosevelt 
in the court of public opinion” (Davis 361) . This interaction between Lind-
bergh and Roosevelt proved to be the beginning of a conflict that soon tore 
much of the country apart .
Roosevelt generally discredited any of his opposition as either ignorant 
or unpatriotic . Lindbergh certainly received this treatment . The President’s 
priority through it all was to eliminate forces that would undermine his sway 
on public opinion, and he was concerned about “not getting ahead” of public 
thought . In general, the President’s agendas were fairly open-ended (McJim-
sey 191); rather than push detailed plans, Roosevelt tried to steer public 
opinion to where he thought it should be . This typical political strategy was 
not compatible with conflicting viewpoints . Alarming forces that could dis-
rupt his efforts were either covered up, like Smith’s reports, or combatted, like 
Lindbergh’s rhetoric . When Lindbergh began giving his isolationist speeches, 
he was approached with a bribe from the President: if Lindbergh halted 
his speeches, the President would create a new Cabinet position for him 
(Lindberg 257) . Whether through bribery or smear campaigns, Roosevelt’s 
administration did everything it could to silence or discredit opposition, and 
the methods aimed at Lindbergh ultimately spilled over onto Smith .
In his memoirs, Smith lists influential gossip columnist and radio broad-
caster Walter Winchell among his principal antagonists (30) . Winchell was 
opposed to everything isolationist . He accused Lindbergh, whom he nick-
named the “Lone Ostrich” (playing on Lindbergh’s traditional “Lone Eagle” 
moniker), of being a Nazi and also sent messages to Roosevelt claiming that 
Smith was an “advisor on the Lindbergh speeches,” calling Smith a “terrific 
Pro-Nazi” (“Rose Bigman”) . Famous broadcaster and journalist Dorothy 
Thompson, who like Smith was one of the earliest voices to speak out against 
Hitler, was openly skeptical of Smith as well (Duffy 190) . The popular colum-
nist and critic of public figures Drew Pearson was also outspoken about the 
questions surrounding Smith’s allegiances (Truman Smith 30) .
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Smith was effectively lumped into the isolationist group which was being 
blasted in the media . Though some columnists directly attacked Smith, he 
also felt the pressure of the polarized media war occurring across the United 
States . From gossip columnists to news broadcasters to cartoonists, the toxic 
climate was compromising objectivity in many media outlets . Even Dr . Seuss 
(Theodor Seuss Geisel) took merciless shots at Lindbergh, repeatedly por-
traying isolationists and in particular Lindbergh as ostriches with their heads 
in the sand . Further, Seuss published multiple images portraying Lindbergh 
in league with Nazi Germany (Minear 28–34) .
These influential members of the press also openly doubted Smith’s 
patriotism, and many more columnists simply lumped Smith in with their 
criticisms of Lindbergh . Shortly after Smith returned to the United States, 
Lindbergh began a long pro-isolationist campaign in which he delivered 
speeches that were broadcast across the nation and internationally in many 
instances . These opinionated broadcasts quickly became controversial as 
the nation split down the middle between isolationism and intervention-
ism . Many columnists, particularly ones who had more liberal stances, were 
quick to point out how fond the Germans were of Lindbergh and how all of 
his speeches were broadcast and cheered by Nazis (“Within” 193–94) . The 
extensive smearing of Lindbergh eventually created a perception of Smith 
that essentially made him “guilty by association” and made him receive most 
of the “echoed accusations that were hurled at Lindbergh” (Duffy 190) .
Smith was similarly associated with Lindbergh by prominent members 
of the Roosevelt administration . Among those whom Smith called the “New 
Dealers who wanted his scalp” were figures like Supreme Court Justice and 
personal friend of Roosevelt, Felix Frankfurter, who Smith claimed was fuel-
ing some of the press attacks (31, 34) . White House Press Secretary under 
Roosevelt, Stephen Early, also spoke out against Smith (Duffy 190) . Sec-
retary of the Treasury and another critic, Henry Morgenthau, approached 
General George Marshall to request that Smith be discharged from the Army 
(Lindbergh 352) .
Likely the most vocal opponent of Smith from the Roosevelt administra-
tion, however, was Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes . Smith recalls an 
instance in 1940 when Ickes, along with Justice Frankfurter, suggested to the 
President that Smith should be court-martialed (31) . Ickes helped to lead a 
unit in the Roosevelt administration that tracked the President’s rivals (Duffy 
182) . Lindbergh described Ickes as “spreading misinformation” in the “cheap-
est and most inexcusable sort of way” (518) . The pressure put on Smith was 
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intense enough that he and his wife, Kay, became convinced they were being 
spied on and having their phones tapped (Lindbergh 405–06) .
The 1940 press attacks on Smith did not end until Bernard Baruch, in 
league with General Marshall, convinced the President to order a halt on the 
smear campaign (Truman Smith 32) . Ickes did not give up, though; shortly 
after the President ordered members of the administration to halt fueling 
press attacks on Smith, Ickes orchestrated a new attack . Smith soon found 
himself the subject of an investigation after it was reported that Smith insulted 
and questioned the intelligence of the President at a cocktail party . This fab-
rication was later discovered to have been devised by Ickes and was utterly 
disproven (Truman Smith 33) .
The heightened aggressiveness of Ickes was largely a result of his staunch 
opposition to racism . Ickes was a vocal opponent of racial discrimination of all 
kinds, and as history has documented well, much of Lindbergh’s rhetoric was 
racially charged (Ickes III 641) . Lindbergh was quite vocal in blaming Jews 
for trying to agitate the American public into moving toward war (Lindbergh 
538) . Ickes made it a priority to try to disrupt and nullify anything that had 
to do with Lindbergh . In his diary, Ickes expressed jubilance when his smear 
campaign began to crawl under Lindbergh’s skin (581) . In correspondence 
between Ickes and Roosevelt, Ickes described Lindbergh as a “ruthless and 
conscious fascist, motivated by a hatred for you personally and a contempt 
for democracy in general,” to which the President responded: “What you say 
about Lindbergh and the potential danger of the man, I agree with whole-
heartedly” (Duffy 211) . The seriousness of these feelings toward Lindbergh 
deeply influenced the perception of Smith in the Roosevelt administration . 
The FBI even kept a record of Smith in their file on Charles Lindbergh, in 
which they listed Smith among potential threats as allegedly being “strangely 
pro-Nazi” (FBI) . Ickes and his fellow critics felt they were doing their coun-
try a service by exposing those who, in their minds, were Nazi sympathizers 
(Ickes 581) .
The overall theme of Smith’s career tends to be that an outstanding 
military man was dragged into politics against his will . Much like his patron 
General Marshall, who tried diligently to remain apart from partisan politics, 
Smith maintained a marked aloofness to politics (Cray 9–10) . Even when he 
found himself being ridiculed and smeared, Smith generally kept his cool . 
During the attacks on him, Smith never once responded . Throughout the 
attacks, Smith kept his head down and did his duty, trusting General Mar-
shall to take care of the attacks (Truman Smith 33–35) . Though much of the 
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small amount of history that includes Smith will present him as “that guy” 
who brought Lindbergh to Germany, Smith’s career offers a variety of learn-
ing opportunities .
conclusion
While contemporary sources try to isolate reasons that Smith’s reports 
were covered up, the reality remains that the poor reception of his reports 
resulted from a diverse collection of domestic political factors . Smith was 
swept into political rivalries that diminished the value of his intelligence 
efforts . Smith’s case and the fate of his reports remind us that the polarized 
nature of politics in the early twenty-first century is hardly unique in the 
annals of U .S . history .
Even today, opinions vary concerning the events surrounding Smith’s 
career . Many of these differences relate directly to the diversity in views 
on the rivalry between Roosevelt and Lindbergh . The majority of research 
conducted specifically on Smith’s career tells a story of a dutiful officer who 
was treated unfairly by the Roosevelt administration; however, not all con-
temporary sources agree . Though the research focused on Smith is limited, 
examinations of the rivalry between Lindbergh and Roosevelt are not . In 
these works, Smith is often mentioned in passing, but these brief glimpses of 
his career are skewed according to the biases of the author . In the majority of 
contemporary work, Smith is paired with Lindbergh; thus, the perception of 
Lindbergh is key in the portrayal of Smith . Some authors praise Lindbergh’s 
contributions to Smith’s intelligence effort and subsequently admire Smith’s 
performance . Others label Lindbergh a Nazi sympathizer, as the Roosevelt 
administration did, and include Smith in their accusations .
Charles Lindbergh stands as one of the most polarizing public figures in 
American history . Historians still bicker about whether he contributed to the 
United States or was little more than a traitor . These issues were magnified 
in the years leading up to World War II and ultimately caused Smith’s intel-
ligence work to be pushed aside in the midst of debates about matters other 
than the substance of his reports .
Looking back, Smith was not shy about admitting his shortcomings . In 
his memoirs, Smith described how his intelligence office completely over-
looked the development of German missile technology . In addition, Smith 
recalled that, through much of the early stages of German military buildup, 
the nature of German air tactics escaped him . Air forces had never before 
been employed to support ground forces, and Smith did not realize that the 
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Nazi regime planned to use their mighty Luftwaffe in this way until late 1937 . 
Smith’s memoirs clearly indicate that he considered these oversights to be 
massive blunders on his part (164–65) .
Despite these failures, the successes of Smith’s intelligence efforts should 
not be underestimated . Though his work on the German Luftwaffe is gener-
ally the primary focus of research because of Lindbergh’s involvement, Smith 
also reported with startling accuracy on German ground forces . In addition, 
the work Smith accomplished on German air developments, with the help 
of Lindbergh, remained unprecedented . Smith was not faultless during his 
service, but his relationship with Lindbergh led him to produce more mean-
ingful intelligence than his foreign counterparts in Berlin . Despite the stellar 
content of Smith’s reports, the United States government remained aloof to 
the gravity of Germany’s military expansion .
Scholars in the early twenty-first century are likely to prove more inter-
ested than their early post-war predecessors in the winds of controversy that 
swirled about the formerly obscure military attaché Truman Smith, especially 
through 1939 and 1940 . Clearly the world order of 2015 is vastly different 
than the one that made possible Hitler’s rapid rise in the 1930s, but the sort 
of political polarization and demonization of ideological opponents exam-
ined in this study have an oddly familiar ring to those of us accustomed to the 
American news media markets of our own times . For us, perhaps the most 
pressing lesson of Truman Smith’s case lies in its function as a cautionary tale 
about the importance of listening to opposing viewpoints . What, ultimately, 
might we be missing when we dismiss out-of-hand the arguments of those 
whom we believe to be political opponents?
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